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THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*

James L. Brierly t

,ANY conclusion about the desirability or the practicability of codi..["""l. fying international law ought to be based on a clear idea of what
the process would involve, and unfortunately "codification" is an
ambiguous word. In the sense in which British and American lawyers
use the word it relates to the form in which the law is presented.
When we codify, we do not regard the task as one of improving the
substance of the law, but as one of collecting the existing rules and
stating them concisely and clearly. It is true that, even so, the work
must involve some element of law-creating, for when we examine the
materials on which we have to work, the customary rules, the judicial
precedents, the particular statutes or conventions, we inevitably come
across points on which no authority exists, or on which the existing
authorities are conflicting, and it would be pedantic to insist that,
because codification is concerned only with the form of the law, these
defects should be reproduced in the finished code. Where the authorities are in conflict therefore, the codifier must choose the rule
which seems the most desirable; where there are gaps in the existing
law, he must suggest a new rule to fill them. To that extent codifiers
must legislate. But it is only a limited extent. In the main, the work
is not one of legislation, but of careful drafting. The few examples
that we in England have of codification have been of this type. We
have codified our law of sale of goods, and of bills of exchange in this
way, and the result has been to tidy up the law on these topics. But
that is its only important effect. It has not provided the layman with
a sort of legal ready-reckoner, which many people seem to think a
code ought to be able to do; and for the practising lawyer the chief
difference is that instead of deducing the applicable rule from the
decisions, he now uses the decisions to explain and illustrate~ the statutory rule.
But the great continental codes of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have been proceedings of a different kind from this, and
continental lawyers naturally take the sense which they give to the
word codification from their own experience of the process in their own
systems. When we examine the motives which led to these continental
codifications, we find that behind most of them was one which Eng-
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lishmen and Americans have never had. For continental nations codification has generally been a means of unifying their law. France
started the fashion in I 804 with the Code Napoleon, not because
Frenchmen had discovered that codified is superior to uncodified law,
but because up to that time there had been different kinds of law in
different parts of the country, and this was an inconvenient state of
things and out of touch with the growing strength of national feelings .
.Other nations have followed the French example, partly no doubt
because of the great prestige that France has always held in intellectual
matters, but many of them, too, had the same need to create unified
national systems of law. An obvious recent example of that is the
Polish codification after the first world war; when Poland recovered
her independence, she naturally wanted to weld together the previously Russian, Prussian, and Austrian parts of the country. And an
important part of that process was the unification of their different
systems of law. England on the other hand never had to undertake a
codification of this kind because our law was unified more than seven
hundred years ago when the King's judges substituted for the differing local laws a system uniform throughout the whole country. Today
it requires an effort to remind ourselves what the original significance
of the term "The Common Law" was.
Not only the meaning that the word "codification" conveys to our
minds, but the technique that is appropriate for carrying it out will
necessarily be determined by the nature of the process that it involves.
When the law is tolerably well settled and defective only in its formulation, codification is a skilled, but otherwise a relatively simple task.
Being a means for improving the form of the law and only to a small
extent its substance, it is a task that can appropriately be handed over to
the lawyers, for it requires just those qualities which a lawyer's training produces, namely, knowledge of the existing law and practice in
drafting. But when, as _in the case of the continental codes, the existing
law is in a condition which calls for important preliminary decisions as
to the substance of the rules that the lawyers are to put into the code,
the task is quite a different one. Lawyers are still needed, but the leading part is not for them, because it1s not for lawyers to decide what the
code is to contain; they can formulate the law when the materials are
given to them, but they cannot create the materials on which they are
to work. The creation of law is always a political and not a juridical
function, and only an authority that has power to legislate can exercise it.
In applying these preliminary remarks about the meaning of codification to the idea of codifying international law, the first question for
consideration is to which kind of codification would the codification of
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international law belong? Would it be codification in the AngloAmerican sense, that is to say, mainly a process of improving the
form of the law? Or would it be a codification of the Continental kind,
that is to say, requiring first and foremost an agreement between the
nations as to the substance of the rules that the code is to contain?
Clearly it would be a process of this second kind. The codifiers would
constantly have to choose between competing rules, to fill up gaps on
points on which the existing law is uncertain or altogether silent, to give
· precision to abstract general principles; in short, at every stage in the
process someone would have to tell them what to put into the code.
If there were any doubt on this point, the experience of the Hague
Conference of 1930, to which I shall presently refer, would prove it up
to the hilt. These decisions about the contents of the code could not
possibly be handed over to international lawyers, because the governments of the world will not be willing to accept whatever rules the
lawyers think would b~ good for them; they will certainly reserve the
deciding voice on that question for themselves.
This point is the heart of the difficulty that stands in the way of
any easy or rapid reduction of the rules of international law to codifi.~d form, and unfortunately it is often overlooked. We are tempted
to think of codification as a ch~ap method of establishing international
order, as something that lawyers could easily do for the world if only
they could be brought to see how badly it needs doing. But that is a
complete delusion. The responsibility cannot be shifted in this lighthearted way on to the shoulders of the lawyers. Lawyers can help;
they can do the donkey work, but the responsibility belongs to all of us,
and of course particularly to the leaders of our nations. For international law can only be codified if and so far as sovereign nations will
agree among themselves on what the lawyers are to put into the code,
and we have only too much evidence of the difficulty of getting agreements of that kind. The ambiguity of the word codification, its use to
describe two processes which differ so-widely both in their objects and
in the techniques that they require, has had most unfortunate effects;
it has disguised the real difficulties and induced men to think of codification as a means of international progress that can be adopted
without any important concessions being made by our nations. It is
something very different from that.
There is no excuse for this easy optimism since the great Conference on codification which was held at The Hague in 1930. The
preparatory work of that Conference was exceedingly thorough. The
League of Nations first appointed a Committee of Experts to advise
what subjects were ripe for codification, and this Committee, after
examining a great number of subjects and consulting the governments
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on them, finally recommended certain suojects out of which the Assembly chose three for treatment at the Conference. Then a second
committee was set up to prepare for the Conference, and this Com- ·
mittee circulated carefully drafted questionnaires on the three subjects
to the governments. When the replies had been received the second
Committee compared them and framed "bases for discussion" on which
it was hoped that the Conference might be able to frame conventions.
I mention these details to show that it was not from any lack of careful
preparation that the Conference failed. Its most valuable legacy was
its documentation, which, as the Committee justly claims, defined the
present state of the law on the three subjects chosen with greater clearness than before.
Some useful lessons can be learned by examining what happened to
each of these three subjects. The subjects were Nationality, Territorial Waters, and Responsibility of States for damage done in their
territories to the person or property of foreigners. The only subject
on which anything at all was achieved was Nationality. Now on that
suqject there are in the existing state of the law two great abuses:
certain people have no nationality-they are "stateless" persons-and
. others have more than one nationality. Every reasonable person would
like to see those two conditions done away with, so that on this subject,
though there might be and were differences as.to method, the Conference had at least definite and agreed aims in view. There was a policy
which everyone would like to see carried out in a reform of the existing
law, and the Conference did succeed in producing protocols on these
two points in the law, some, but not all, of which have been ratified and
are now in force, though unfortunately the ratifications have not been
many. The first essential of any process of codification by international
convention is a substantial measure of agreement on what the code is
to contain. It is perfectly useless to assemble a conference and merely
say to it, "Codify such and such a subject." That only makes sense
when the law is already well settled, and not when, as in international
law, the law has to be settled before the codifiers can get to work.
This result was disappointing enough, but at least something was
achieved. But on the two other subjects the failure was complete. On
territorial waters no convention could even be drafted because no agreement could be reached on the fundamental question of the width of
these waters. The reason was simply that nations have different interests in this matter, and they were not willing to make the concessions
which a convention would have called for. There was therefore no
agreed policy for the Conference to translate into law. The present
differing views are sometimes inconvenient and they do sometimes give
rise to friction, but evidently the states did not feel that the incon-
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venience of this unsettled state of the law was so serious ,as to make an
agreement really urgent. On the responsibility of states, the Committee which dealt with the subject did not even succeed in producing a report for consideration by the Conference as a whole. Again
the reason was clear and might surely have been foreseen. There is a
deep division of opinion on that subject among states, especially on
the point whether the existing law prescribes an objective standard
for the treatment of aliens, or whether it is satisfied if a state merely
does not discriminate in its treatment between aliens and its own nationals. Everyone agrees that this state of the law is most unsatisfactory,
but that was not enough to secure a, successful codification. Once again
we come back to the essential point that codification by international
convention can only succeed if states have an agreed policy, if there is
some definite reform of the law which they can instruct the lawyers
to carry out in the code. Codification in the abstract is not such a policy.
In the light of the results of the Hague Conference, we have no
excuse if we fail to recognize the obstacles that stand in the way of
codification by the methods hitherto used. The aim has been to secure
conventions signed and ratified by governments and converting existing
customary international law with all its uncertainties and incompleteness into binding conventional law formulated in clear and comprehensive terms. But is there then no other method that might be tried?
Sir Cecil Hurst, formerly president of the Permanent Court of International Justice, has suggested, in a paper entitled "A Plea for the
Codification of International Law on New Lines," which he read before
the English Grotius Society in I 946, that there is an alternative method,
and his suggestions have met with very general support among the international lawyers of many countries.
He suggests a more gradual approach to the goal. He regards the
attempt to secure binding international conventions as having for the
time being definitely failed. He does not deny that that is the ultimate
ob}ective, but before we try again to reach it he thinks there is a preliminary task that we must undertake, that this will not be a simple or
a short piece of work. For, another failure would be disastrous. It
would not simply leave things as they are, because a failure to reach
agreement throws doubt even on rules that have hitherto been generally assumed to be part of customary international law.
In Sir Cecil Hurst's view there are three conditions that must be
fulfilled if a new effort is to succeed. The first is that the work cannot
be done by governments or by delegates working under government
instructions. At first sight, that may seem a surprising suggestion, because, after all, only states can give the force of law to a code; no one
can make international law for them. The objection to asking governments to undertake the task in the first instance is, however, that, if
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they do, they will inevitably be impelled to aim at a codification of
the Continental type, to lay down the law not as it is but as they think
it ought to be, and, that if they do s-qcceed in producing the draft of a
codifying convention on these Jines, they will naturally ask themselves,
before they accept it, whether its terms accord with their own particular interests. If one asks why these should be the results of an attempted
codificatioh by governments, the explanation lies in the nature of the
materials which international law provides for them. Certainly it is
theoretically conceivable that states should make "declarations" rather
than "conventions," frame, that is to say, agreed statements of the law
in its existing state, but the result would not be worth the effort. The
Conference which produced the Declaration of London on the rules
of naval warfare in 1909 started with this intention. Its P.urpose, said
the Official Report, was "to note, to define, and where needful, to
complete what might be considered as customary law." 1 But the London Conference found it impossible to limit its work in this way;
there were so many points on which it was necessary to "complete" the
law, so many controversial questions on which it had to adopt compromise solutions, that in the end what was called a declaration was really
a convention, and as the compromise solutions were unacceptable to
many states the draft was never ratified. On the other hand, the Codification Conference of 1930 did not try to limit its work to stating the
existing law; it had been expressly directed by the League Assembly
to aim at adapting the law to contemporary conditions of international
life. But whether a proposed law-making convention is adapted to
contemporary conditions of international life is a question which every
state insists on answering for itself in the light 6f its own special interests, and it will do that even if the convention is styled a declaration.
It will look closely at all the terms, it will try to foresee all the possible
implications of any general principle which it is invited to accept, it
will consider whether an acceptance may not perhaps prove embarrassing in some future contingency, and even if it inclines to the view that
the principle in question is only declaratory of the existing rule, it will
ask whether there is really anything to be gained by subscribing to it
in unequivocal terms, or whether it may not be wiser to leave the matter
open to argument if at some future date that should turn out to be
expedient. The fact is that states do not bind themselves by the obligations of a treaty, codifying or other, unless they are satisfied that its
terms will promote their own interests, and unfortunately the mere
urge to improve the law by codifying it is not an interest which presents
1 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPER, Misc. No. 5, p. 345 (1909); translation:
THE DECLARATION OF LoNnoN, FEBRUARY 26, 1909, Carnegie Endowment for
Int. Peace, p. 135 (1919).
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a strong appeal. No doubt this cautious attitude is exasperating to the
international lawyer, but in itself it is not wholly unreasonable.
For reasons such as these the ~ark then, in Sir Cecil Hurst's opinion, should be, in the first instance, not governmental but unofficial.
His second condition is that it cannot be done on an individual basis.
In the last century there were produced by private individuals a number of unofficial codes of international law which were of some interest
and value. But this is no longer an appropriate method for several
reasons. One is that the :field has become too big for any one man to
survey in this'way. Another is that with the increase of the number of
points at which states are in contact with one another, it becomes more
and more difficult for an individual, however fair he tries to be, to rise
· above the national tradition as to what are the rules of the law in which
he personally has been trained. And still another reason is that with the
growth of international adjudication and the development of case law
the opinions of international jurists, even of the first rank, carry less
weight than they used to, and no single man today could produce a
work which the world would accept as really authoritative.
Before stating his third condition, which contains his alternative
to the method hitherto followed, Sir Cecil Hurst dealt with an argument against any kind of codification. This is one that makes a certain
appeal to English, and probably also to American lawyers. Most English lawyers are not much attracted by codification; they think it tends
to petrify the law, to strangle its development and prevent that steady
adaptation to changing social conditions to which the common law has
accustomed us. This argument has some force when it is applied to
international codification. If, for instance, the Conference of r930 had
, been able to agree on the width of territorial waters, we might today
be finding the question of the Continental Shelf which has suddenly
acquired such great practical importance a somewhat embarrassing one. ·
As it is, we may reasonably hope that the new questions that have
arisen will be settled by a development of the customary law, which
will provide for the new interests which have emerged. On the other
hand, Anglo-American lawyers, Sir Cecil Hurst thinks, ought not to
press the analogy of the common law too far. The alternative to,
codification is to rely on the growth 9f custom and of judicial precedents for the development of the law, and both of these are slowworking processes. We cannot let the improvement of the system wait
until the courts have refashioned the customary law and supplied us
with a wealth of precedents comparable to those of the common law.
Moreover, international law is not-a case law system, and precedents
are not one of its primary sources. In any case international courts
are quite rightly cautious; they know that they cannot legislate for
states, even in the limited sense in which judges legislate for us in a
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common law country. We cannot afford to accept the juristic pessimism
of the extreme historical school, which would have us believe that law
grows, but that it cannot be made. That is only a half-truth, or less
than that. Instead we must do something positive to stimulate the development of international law.
Sir Cecil Hurst's third condition is that the next step ought to be
a combination of national and international effort on the part of international lawyers. In every country there should be a group of lawyers,
working to an agreed international plan, and formulating the law, with
all its present imperfections, as they think it is. These national contributions would be the material on which an international body of
lawyers would work, and out of which they would try to make an
agreed formulation or "restatement" of the existing law. This restatement would have no official status; its authority would depend entirely
on its scientific merits. Nor would it be final; it would constantly be
subject to discussion and revision. But it would provide governments
with a firm foundation, a starting point, for the modification by convention of any of its provisions which might for one reason or another
require amendment.
The idea that lies behind this suggested method of proceeding by
restatements is clearly much the same as that which the American Law
Institute had in drafting its restatements of American law, and those
who favor it hope that it would have a similar effect; they hope, that
is to say, that the restatements would be examined by, and exercise an
influence on the judgments of courts both international and national,
applying international law; that they would help to mold opinion, to
harmonize some of the present conflicting views as to what the rules
are; that they would show governments where the law is defective or
out of date, and perhaps induce them from time to time to amend it
by conventions.
Something of the sort was adumbrated by Mr. Elihu Root as long
ago as 1911, and in the United States a splendid beginning has been
made by the Harvard Research in International Law carried out in
the years between the wars by a group of American international lawyers under the inspiration of Judge Manley Hudson of the Harvard
Law School, and these Harvard Reports might well be taken as a basis
for the work of the other proposed national groups of international
lawyers.
What, then, of the future prospects? Last year the United Nations decided to set up an International Law Commission for the progressive development and eventual codification of international law.
The wording shows that the Commission is not to be limited to actual
codifying work, and it may be able to assist in other ways in developing international law. There are to be fifteen members, who are to be
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elected by the General Assembly meeting in Paris this year. It is
intended that the members should be independent experts, not in any
way representing their governments, and much will depend on the
loyal acceptance of this idea both by the governments and by the
members themselves. In the preparatory committee which, prepared
the plan for the Commission the British would have liked to reduce
the risk of political appointments by entrusting the selection of the
members to the International Court of Justice, but that proposal was
not accepted. Both the Americans and the British wanted to stress the
scientific nature of the work; so far as it was codifying work, we
wanted to ptoceed in the first instance by way of restatements of the
existing law, as suggested by Sir Cecil Hurst; where it was a work
of developing the law by extending its area to new fields we agreed
that this could only be done by multilateral governmental conventions.
The restatement idea, however, met with opposition of two kinds. some more conservative members of the Committee did not think that
the failure of the 1930 Conference was decisive; they wanted to give
the same method another trial. But the most violent opposition came
from the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states. They are intensely jealous of
anything that might even remotely impair their sovereignty. They
wanted to keep the whole work under governmental control; they
would even have liked to prevent the Commission from taking up a
subject unless expressly directed to do so by the General Assembly.
They wanted either governmental conventions or nothing at all. Of
course the restatements which we were advocating could not in fact
have affected the sovereignty of states because they would have no
binding force, but these states apparently did not want to be exposed
even to the persuasive force that the restatements might have had. In
the end a compromise was reached which on the whole is fairly satisfactory. The word "restatement" does not appear in the constitution
of the Commission. It is to prepare drafts and these are to have the
form of draft_ articles for conventions; the General Assembly will
decide what, if anything, is to be done with these drafts. It may decide
to do nothing; in that case the draft, having been published, will in
effect be a restatement, and its influence will depend' on the quality of
the work put into it. It may adopt the draft by Resolution, which,
though it would not give the draft any binding force, might add to its
persuasive force. It may recommend that the members should turn
the draft into a convention. Or, finally, it may convoke a conference of
states to frame a convention on the subject of the draft. On the whole,
a promising start has been made; the machinery that is being set up is
capable of producing valuable "results if its purpose is not defeated by
the political tensions in the present international outlook. But ·the work
will be arduous and quick results are not to be expected.

